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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings. and Concise Statement of the Facts

The Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and Statements of Facts from the
standpoint of each party are adequately set forth from each party's perspective in the Parties·
respective briefs, and, as such, \vill not be re-iterated herein in the interest of brevity.
Furthermore, Appellant herein \Viii only directly address certain major issues discussed by the
Respondent in its Brief, and will refer to, and incorporate by reference as though fully set forth
herein, Appellant's Opening Brief v/ith regard to the remainder of lier argument
With regard to the factual dispute set forth on Page 6 of Respondent's Brief. Respondent
takes issue with Appellant's statement that "Throughout, Friis indicated that her grade could be
affected by her response to his action," and then goes on to say that there is "·no citation to the
record.''

Respondent's Brief at 6.

However, this statement is set forth on Paragraph 6 of

Appellant's Affidavit in Opposition to Summary Judgment

submitted in response to

Respondent's initial Motion for Summary Judgment filed in United States District Court for the
District of Idaho (hereinafter "Federal District CourC or "Federal Court"), and in the record
herein on page 235. Even if Respondent takes issue with this testimony from Appellant, it is not
the provin:::e of the Court to determine credibility or weigh the facts at the summary judgment
stage. See Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990). That is the province of
the trier of fact For the purposes of Summary Judgment, any factual dispute must be viewed in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d
876, 878 (1991). Thus, Respondent's dispute of this factual allegation by Appellant does not
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provide grounds for Summary Judgment in this case. It is simply fodder for cross-examination at
trial.

II.

A.
l.

ARGUMENT

The Standard Pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights Act (lHR4) Claims.

The Ninth Circuit's Determination Regard in 2. the IHRA Standard is the Law of the Case.
In the first portion of

Argument, Respondent, once again, asserts that the more

restrictive Title lX analysis should be applied to educational discrimination claims pursuant to
as opposed to a Title VIJ analysis. Respondent's Brief at J 2. Respondent

opines

that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter ''Ninth Circuit")
in its ruling to the contrary. Id. Hmvever, Respondent did not

certiorari to the Cnited

States Supreme Court, nor did it seek reconsideration or en bane reviev,• by the Ninth Circuit
itself. Moreover, Respondent did nor cross-appeal the District Court's detennination as to the
Title VII standard follmi·ing remand to State Court \Vhen it had the opportunity to do so. As
such, even in the event that this Court may disagree with the Ninth Circuit's decision, that
decision is now the laYv of this case, and binding upon the parties thereto.
While the instant situation, in which this Court is faced with an appeal of decision
remanded by a

court, is somewhat unusual, the discussion of the Law of the

Doctrine in the early Idaho case of Hall r Blaclanan, 9 Idaho 555,

P. 608 ( 1904) remams

instrnctive. There, this Court held that when a "question was directly raised upon [the first]
appeal, and was squarely before the court, and its determination was essential to a determination
of that appeal," id at 609, ''whatever the opinion of the court might be at [the time of second
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appeal] as to the correctness of the conclusions there reached, or the soundness of any legal
principle there announced, its judgment cannot now be invoked to disturb such questions as have
become a final adjudication in the case." Id. In other words, as the rule is summarized in the
headnotes to the reported version of the case, "the appellate court is bound by its decision

011

a

prior appeal in the same cause, whether right or \Vrong." Id. at 608.
Here, the Ninth Circuit properly and appropriately reviewed a question of State law over
\vhich the Federal District Court had validly exercised supplemental jurisdiction. The issue of
the appropriate analysis pursuant to an llIR,i\ educational discrimination claim was "directly
raised upon appeal, and was squarely before the [Ninth Circuit], and its deteITT!ination was
essential to a determination of that appeal.'' As such, the parties, and this court, are now bound
by the dec1sion, and. to the extent that this Court were to express disagreement, it would only be
appropriate to do so by way of dicta, which \Vould provide direction in future cases. Therefore.
the Ninth Circuit's detern1ination that a Title Vll, rather than Title IX, analysis applies to an
IHRA claim is the "law of the case," and should not be disturbed upon this appeal.
The Ninth Circuit's Detennination Regarding the IHRA Standard is Correct.
Should this Court decide to revisit the issue as to the appropriate standard to apply in an
IBRA educational discrimination case, the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Title VII
standard, which allows for respondeat superior liability, Miller's v. Maxwell Int'!., Inc., 99 I F.2d
583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), is correct. Under the Federal civil remedial scheme for discrimination.
there are

nrn

separate and distinct statutes providing for remedies in cases of employment and

educational discrimination.

Employment discrimination is handled pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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2000e et seq., commonly known as "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'" (hereinafter "Title
VII"). Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b ), an "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in

an industry affecting commerce ,vho has fifteen or more employees for each \Vorking day in
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the cun-ent or preceding calendar year and any
such a person.'' Id. (emphasis added).
Educational discrimination, on the other had, is prohibited by on the Federal level by 20

U.S. C. § 1681, known as "Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972" (hereinafter "Title

IX"). The important distinction is that, under Title IX, the "agent" provision is absent from the
definition of an educational institution. 20 U.S.C. § 168l(c). Thus, there is a higher standard
order to make a Federal claim of discrimination against an educational institution than there is in
the employment context, as "agents" are not covered under the latter statute.

v. Lago

Vista Independent School Dist., 524 L.S. 274,290 (1998).
However.

under

the

Idaho

Human

Rights

Ac1,

employment

educationai

discrimination are prohibited under the same statute - to-wit: Idaho Code § 67-5901 et seq.
Most importantly,

Idaho statute specificallv inc1udes the key word

in its definition of

an Educational Institution in Idaho Code § 67-5902(10). The distinction between the standard
for employer and educational institution }iability for the acts of its employee in the Federal
scheme is absent in the State remedial scheme for disciimination claims.

the Federal cases

which analyze employer liability for the discriminatory acts of its agent m the Title VII
employment context are instructive, while the Title IX cases are not.

Thus, the IHRA is

analogous to the Title VII, not the Title IX Federal standard with regard to sex discrimination

--~
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claims.

B.

Faragher/Ellerth Affirmative Defense.

The majority of the arguments and discussion set fmih in Respondent's Brief are
adequately briefed in Appellant's Opening Brief, as well as the Memoranda in Opposition to
Summary Judgment that are on the record herein, and, thus, Appellant hereby incorporates and
re-asserts here arguments set forth therein.
Throughout the course of this case, and in its briefing, Respondent relies heavily upon the

Faraghcr/Ellerth affirmative defense, in which an employer may defeat a claim for sexual
harassment if: ''(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff . . . unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
hann othenvise." Faragher v. Ci(v of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). Respondent's
Brief at 13-16. It should be noted, however, that the defense is unavailable if adverse action
was, actually, taken. Id. at 808.
On the availability of the Faragher defense, Respondent claims that no adverse action
was taken, and that the change from an "I" grade to an "F" occurred automatically as of a certain
date. Respondent's Brief at 17-18. However, Respondents also state that the "I" grade to begin
with was a result of favorable action on the part of Friis, contrary to NIC policy. Id. Given that
Friis was able to provide Appellant with an "I" grade on the prior occasion, a rational trier of fact
could reasonably find that the failure to do so following the incidents of harassment constituted
adverse action.

Furthermore, a rational trier of fact could also reasonably find that that the
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harassment at the hands of Friis made it impossible for Appellant to complete the course, akin to
a "constructive discharge" in the employment context, thus resulting in the
it should be left to the trier of fact as to whether NIC may even

n,,,,,-.;,.,on

grade. Therefore,
with the Faragher

defense, and, thus, Summary Judgment \:Vas not appropriate.
However, in the event that Respondent may proceed to assert the Faragher defense,
Respondent, and the District Court's, primary

was upon the second element, i.e., that it is

relieved from liability on the grounds that Appellant "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
othenvise." Respondent's B1ief at 1
argument that she had, in fact, informed
Respondem cites to the case of Hill v.
2000), .in ,vhich the plainti

.S. at 807. In response to Appeliant's
employees of her discomfort with Friis,

· 'F.in., Inc.. 1~.18· F'''
r4" l·7 th
(-.Jenera,
.Ja 6...,9
.) , b'.)

c·ff.

had sent anonymous letters ( one under a fictitious name), which she

then denied wnting. Id. at 641. Of course, no reasonable employer couid effectively invesjgate
an anonymous complaint, especially when the complainant would not even acknowledge having
made said complaint.

In this case, the counselor and the teaching assistant had ampie

opportunity to follow up, ask additional questions, or start a preliminary investigation, but failed
to do so

a far cry from an anonymous and fictitiously signed letter subsequently disavowed by

the plaintiff. On these facts, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Appellant had made
a reasonable effort at notification at that point.
Even if this Court should find that these earlier reports were not a reasonable effort at
notification, again, the Federal Courts have held that, in some circumstances, fear of retaliation
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can justify a delay in reporting the harassment. Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710. 725 (8 th

Cir. 2007); Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35-36 (1 S\ Cir. 2003); Mota v.
[Jniversi~)' of Texas Houswn Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512, 525-26 (5 th Cir. 2001).

Furthermore. the Courts which have discussed when a delay may be reasonable have wisely
declined to adopt any "bright line test" as to the reasonableness of the extent of such a delay.
Reed, 333 F. 3d at 35; Mota, 261 F.Jd at 525. Given the fact-driven 1~ature of discrimination

cases, Appellant would urge this Court to examine "reasonableness" on a case-by-case basis, to
be determined, in most cases, by the trier of fact. rather than adopting a "one-size-fits-all" test for
reasonableness of the fear or the delay. It should be noted that, in lvfota, tbe Court allowed a
sexual harassment claim to proceed when the plaintiff did not formally report the harassment
until eight months follov.:ing the last incident. Mota. 21 F.3d at 525.
~ext, Respondent argues that the "reason for reporting the harassment \Vas inconsistent
with Title VII,'' and goes on to discuss the negative effects of the "F" grade. Respcndent's Brief,
34-36. However, it is perfectly reasonable for a civil plaintiff to seek compensation for damages
incurred as a direct and proximate result of what she perceived to be adverse educational action,
and one can certainly infer that, even though the primary objective of Title VII (in this case, the

IHRA.) may be to prevent further harassment, compensation for damages proximately caused by
said harassment is most certainzv a secondary objective. Furthermore, monetary compensation
to damaged plaintiffs serves a detenent effect in providing an incentive for prevention of
discriminatory behavior in the future and by others.
C""".-----=-M=o-"'ti=o:.::cn'-"-'fo"-'r'-R=e=-=c""o..:!n""s.:..:id=-=e=-=rc.=a~t.:..:ioc:..:nc:..:.
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Finally, Respondent argues that the Motion for Reconsideration did not require the
submission of ne\v or additional facts or evidence, and relies upon the Court of Appeals' decision
in Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468. 473. 147 P.3d 100, 105 (CL App. 2006), which declined
to adept a strict requirement of new facts or evidence in order to justify a grant of
reconsideration.

Being a decision of the Court of Appeals, to the extent that the Johnson

decision is inconsistent with this court's ruling in Coeur d~4.lene 1\1ining Co.

1·.

First Nat. Bank of

North Idaho. 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 103 7 (1990), this Court's decision in the latter

case would control. However, even though the Court of Appeals felt that requiring new evidence
to support a Motion for Reconsideration "would prevent a party from drawing tl1e trial corni's

attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even flagrant
errors except through an appeal," Johnson, 143 Idaho at 4 73, 14 7 P.3d at l 05, that does not grant
the district court the absolute ability to grant reconsideration without some basis for doing so.
Taking Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. and Johnson together, Appellant would submit that the
mere citation of additional persuasive authority is not sufficient to justify a reconsideration of the
District Court's prior decision. As such, the District Court abused its discretion in granting the
motion for reconsideration, and, it remains, that the District Court's decision should be
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
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lll.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Comi should be
REVERSED, VACATED, and the matter REMANDED to the District Court with instructions
pursuant to the legal and equitable principles set fo1th hereinabove.
DATED this 10th day of August, 201 L
JAMES McMILLAN,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing on the following by the method indicated below:

_K.__ U.S. Mail
Kirtlan G. Naylor/Bruce J. Castleton
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock, Sre. 610
BoJSe, lD 83702

Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~ - Facsimile to: (208) 383-9516

Attornevsfor Respondent NIC
Peter C. Erbland
Paine Hamblen, L.L.P.
701 Front Ave.
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Attorney for Respondent Friis
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X U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
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